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I. INTRODUCTION
For years, critics have argued that the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit should be divided because it has grown too large to
manage its caseload effectively.' They blame the Ninth Circuit's size for
alleged increases in intra-circuit conflicts, inefficiency, delay, and a lack
of collegiality among its judges.! In recent years, conservative
congressmen in the Pacific Northwest have criticized the San Francisco-
based circuit for its "liberal" rulings on everything from the environment
to the death penalty?
On November 26, 1997, Congress created the Commission on
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Harry Pregerson, United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit; J.D., magna cum laude, 1998, Loyola Law School; B.A., cum
laude, 1995, Whittier College.
** Former extem to Judge Pregerson; J.D. 1999, U.C.L.A. Law School; M.P.H.,
sumnma cure laude, 1994, U.C.L.A.; M.D. 1988, U.C. Irvine; B.A., magna cum laude,
1984, U.C.L.A.
*** Former extem to Judge Pregerson; J.D. 1999, U.C.L.A.; B.A., summa cum
laude, 1996, U.C.L.A.
The authors would like to thank the following for their assistance in the preparation of
this article: Judge Harry Pregerson, Cathy Catterson, Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, Shelley Levine, Serge Avakian, Peder Batalden, and the staff and
editors of the San Diego Law Review.
1. See David G. Savage, Panel Urges Realignment of Appeals Court, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 8, 1998, at A3.
2. See Conrad Bums, Dividing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: A Proposition
Long Overdue, 57 MONT. L. REV. 245, 250-51 (1996).
3. See 9th Circuit Split It in 3, Panel Says, ARIz. DAILY STAR, Oct. 8, 1998, at
9A; Savage, supra note 1, at A3.
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Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals.4  The
Commission was headed by the Honorable Byron R. White, retired
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. It was charged
with studying the structure of the federal courts of appeals, focusing on
whether the Ninth Circuit should be divided
On December 18, 1998, the Commission issued its report and
recommended an unprecedented reorganization of the Ninth Circuit.'
The Commission recommended that Congress reorganize the Ninth
Circuit into Northern, Middle and Southern divisions. Under the
proposed plan, a majority of each division's judges would reside within
the division's borders,7 and each division would have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear appeals from lower courts and administrative
agencies within its bounds. The Commission considered and rejected
proposals to divide the Ninth Circuit into two separate circuits and
thereby create a new Twelfth Circuit.8
On January 19, 1999, Senators Frank H. Murkowski and Slade Gorton
introduced the Federal Ninth Circuit Reorganization Act of 1999.9 The
bill is verbatim the model act proposed by the White Commission.
This Article critically analyzes the Commission's recommendation.
Part II reviews the history and background of the debate whether the
Ninth Circuit should be divided. Part Ell examines the Commission's
findings. Part IV evaluates the Commission's proposal and the reasons
the Commission offers in support of its recommendation. Part V
discusses criticisms of the Ninth Circuit that the Commission did not
address and analyzes whether those criticisms justify the Ninth Circuit's
division. Part VI examines the ways in which the Ninth Circuit has
innovated to deal with increasing workloads and suggests that these
4. See COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF
APPEALS, PUB L. No. 105-119, FINAL REPORT 1 (1998) [hereinafter REPORT].
5. See id.
6. See id. at iii.
7. See COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF
APPEALS, TENTATIVE DRAFr REPORT 41 (1998) [hereinafter DRAFT REPORT]. A minority
of each division's judges would also reside outside the division's borders. See id.
8. See id. at 39.
9. Federal Ninth Circuit Reorganization Act of 1999, S. 253, 106th Cong. The
asserted purpose of Senate Bill 253 is "[t]o provide for the reorganization of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, and for other purposes." Id. Murkowski is a Republican
Senator from Alaska and Gorton is a Republican Senator from Washington. Both
Senators have previously endorsed bills to split the Ninth Circuit.
10. This Article addresses the recommendations of the Final Report.
innovations are solutions to problems that will soon become common to
all federal courts of appeals.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Ninth Circuit and the Federal Courts of Appeals
The present arrangement of the federal courts of appeals can be traced
to the Judiciary Act of 1789." The 1789 Act created a federal judicial
district and a one-judge district court in each of the then-eleven states.'2
The Act divided the eleven districts into three "circuit courts" and
thereby created an intermediate tier of federal courts with limited
appellate duties.'3
These original circuit courts were the principal federal trial courts.
They heard major federal criminal cases, diversity actions, and civil
cases in which the United States was a party.'4 The circuit courts had no
judges of their own. Rather, they were presided over by three-judge
panels composed of one district judge and two Supreme Court Justices
who "rode circuit."'5 The original circuit courts had some appellate
jurisdiction to review "specified categories of district court decisions."'6
The United States Supreme Court, however, functioned as the primary
appellate court.'7 Congress eventually created circuit judgeships which
assumed the role previously played by Supreme Court Justices, whose
circuit riding was reduced to a symbolic minimum.'8
By 1866, Congress had realigned the circuit courts' boundaries
11. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73; Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing
Circuit Boundaries. Why the Proposal to Divide the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit Is Not Such a Good Idea, 22 ARIz. ST. L.J. 917, 919 (1990). The
Judiciary Act was passed pursuant to Congress' power to vest "[t]he judicial power of
the United States" in lower federal courts that Congress may "from time to time ordain
and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
12. The federal district courts were trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Their
docket was largely comprised of cases in admiralty, forfeitures and penalties, and minor




15. See id. "This approach saved the money a separate corps of judges would
require, exposed the justices to the state laws and legal practices that affected the
Supreme Court docket, and promoted familiarity with the government in the country's
far reaches." Id.
16. Baker, supra note 11, at 919. The original circuit courts had a limited
appellate function for larger civil and admiralty cases heard in the district courts. See
REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
17. See Baker, supra note 11, at 919.
18. See id. at 920.
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thirteen times.19 The primary purpose of these initial reorganizations
was to adjust the trial assignments of the Supreme Court Justices. 0 In
1866, Congress again reorganized the circuits, creating an arrangement
that vaguely represents the present layout. The then-nine circuits
stretched across the territories that today make up the forty-eight
contiguous United States. The Ninth Circuit originally encompassed
California, Nevada, and Oregon. Idaho, Montana, and Washington were
added soon thereafter.2'
The next important development in the creation of the present system
of federal circuit courts of appeals came in 1891 with the passage of the
Circuit Court of Appeals Act.2 This statute was enacted in response to
the federal courts' exploding dockets. The 1891 Act created a circuit
court of appeals for each of the nine circuits.' The original circuit courts
were transformed into exclusively trial courts, and their appellate
jurisdiction was transferred to the new circuit courts of appeals. The
1891 Act also shifted much of the Supreme Court's appellate caseload to
the new circuit courts.2' The present makeup of the Ninth Circuit
emerged in the 1910s with the addition of Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii and
Guam.
B. Circuit Divisions in the Twentieth Century
In the twentieth century, Congress has twice divided existing circuits.
In 1929, Congress divided the Eighth Circuit and created the Tenth
Circuit. In addition, Congress divided the Fifth Circuit in 1981 and
created the Eleventh Circuit.' The sole purpose for dividing the Eighth
Circuit was to relieve that court's workload.2 The rationale underlying
the Fifth Circuit split is more relevant to the question whether a Ninth
19. See REPORT, supra note 4, at 8.
20. See id.
21. See Baker, supra note 11, at 920.
22. See id. at 921.
23. See REPORT, supra note 4, at 11.
24. See Baker, supra note 11, at 921. In 1911, the circuit courts were finally
abolished and their functions transferred to the federal district courts. See id.
25. See REPORT, supra note 4, at 11. "The Act's effect on the Supreme Court was
immediate-filings dropped from 623 in 1890 to 275 in 1892." Id.
26. See Baker, supra note 11, at 921.
27. See id. at 923.
28. See id. The statute that divided the Eighth Circuit also created two new
judgeships. See id.
Circuit split is now appropriate.
In 1973, Congress created the Commission on Revision of the Federal
Court Appellate System." The so-called Hruska Commission3& '
performed research and conducted hearings to decide whether Congress
should divide the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.32 Congress' internal
disagreements over the Hruska Commission's proposals and the
subsequent failure to reach an acceptable compromise proposal
postponed resolution of the matter until 1978."3 In that year, Congress
increased the Fifth Circuit's judgeships to twenty-six and authorized any
court of appeals with more than fifteen active judges to divide itself into
administrative units and to perform its en banc function with fewer than
all its members. 4 Rather than internally divide itself, the Fifth Circuit
Judicial Council unanimously petitioned Congress to split the circuit.
Congress obliged and created the Eleventh Circuit.35
The suggestion that Congress also divide the Ninth Circuit is not a
new one. Since before World War II, Congress has considered various
schemes to divide the Ninth Circuit.36 But each drive to divide the Ninth
Circuit has failed for at least one of a variety of reasons. For example,
much of Congress' internal dissension over the Hruska Commission
report resulted from the Commission's recommendation that Congress
divide the Ninth Circuit, divide the State of California, and place one-
half of California into each of the two resulting circuits.3' In addition to
its inability to agree over the Hruska Commission's recommendations,
Congress also failed to pass bills to split the Ninth Circuit in 1983 and
1990.38
In 1995, conservative senators from the Northwest resounded the
29. See id. at 925 (noting that the Fifth Circuit split "is the most significant
legislative precedent for the current debate over dividing the Ninth Circuit" because it is
"[n]earer in time and more similar in complexity").
30. See Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807.1.C.
31. The Commission was headed by Roman Hruska, a senator from Nebraska. See
Baker, supra note 11, at 925.
32. See id. But see Arthur D. Hellman, Dividing the Ninth Circuit: An Idea Whose
Tine Has Not Yet Come, 57 MONT. L. REv. 261, 269 (1996) (stating that the criteria the
Hruska Commission used to determine whether a circuit should be divided is not
satisfied by the present Ninth Circuit and concluding that the Hruska Commission's
recommendations are largely irrelevant today and should therefore be given little
weight).
33. See Baker, supra note 11, at 926.
34. See Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, §§ 3(b), 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1632-
33 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1994)).
35. See Baker, supra note 11, at 927.
36. See Carl Tobias, Suggestions for Studying the Federal Appellate System, 49
FLA. L. REv. 189, 196 (1997).
37. See id.
38. See id. at 197.
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rallying cry and introduced yet another proposal to split the Ninth
Circuit and create a new Twelfth Circuit. 9 Once again unable to reach a
compromise, the Senate instead approved the creation of a study
commission. ° The Senate's proposal was sent to the House, which took
no additional action on the proposal during the 104th Congress. 4' In
1997, the 105th Congress resumed the debate and resolved to create a
commission to study the problem and make a report to Congress.
2
1H. THE WHITE COMMISSION REPORT
A. Creation of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the
Federal Courts of Appeals
President Clinton signed Public Law Number 105-119 into law on
November 26, 1997, and created the Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals. 43 The Commission notes
that it was created "in the wake of disagreement.., over the desirability
of splitting the Ninth Circuit into two or more separate circuits, and if it
were to be split, how best to do so."" The Commission's task was to
"study the structure and [present] alignment of the Federal Court of
Appeals system, with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit."' The
Commission was instructed to "report to the President and the Congress
its recommendations for such changes in circuit boundaries or structure
39. The bill was sponsored by Senators Slade Gorton (R-Wash.), Conrad R. Bums
(R-Mont.), Frank H. Murkowski (R-Alaska), Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), Dirk Kempthome
(R-Idaho), Larry E. Craig (R-Idaho), Bob Packwood (R-Or.), and Mark 0. Hatfield (R.-
Or.). See SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1995, S. REP. No. 104-197 (1995) [hereinafter SENATE
REPORT]. The "measure's introduction constituted the fourth effort to divide the appeals
court in the last thirteen years." Tobias, supra note 36, at 198. Under Senate Bill 956
(approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee and substituted with the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1995), the new Twelfth Circuit would have
included Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington; the new
Ninth Circuit would have contained California, Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern
Mariana Islands. See Hellman, supra note 32, at 261. For a thorough analysis of Senate
Bill 956, see Carl Tobias, Why Congress Should Not Split the Ninth Circuit, 50 SMU L.
REv. 583 (1997).
40. See Tobias, supra note 36, at 201.
41. See id. at 201-02.
42. See H.R. 2267, 105th Cong. § 305 (1997).
43. See REPORT, supra note 4, at 1.
44. Id.
45. Act of Nov. 26, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305(a)(1)(B)(ii), 111 Stat. 2491.
as may be appropriate for the expeditious and effective disposition of the
caseload of the Federal Courts of Appeals, consistent with fundamental
concepts of fairness and due process."4
On December 19, 1997, Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed the
Commission's five members The Chief Justice appointed Justice
Byron R. White,48 Judge Gilbert S. Merritt,49 Judge Pamela Ann Rymer, °
Judge William D. Browning,5 and N. Lee Cooper.12  The White
Commission reviewed previous studies of the appellate system,
conducted public hearings, and invited and received written statements. 3
As part of its research, the White Commission also conducted surveys of
circuit and district judges. On October 7, 1998, the Commission made
its draft report available on its website.4 On December 18, 1998, the
Commission issued its Final Report.
B. The Commission's Proposal: Internally Divide the Ninth Circuit,
But Do Not Split It into Two Separate Circuits
The White Commission recommends the creation of three regionally-
based adjudicative divisions within the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Northern Division would include the districts of Alaska, Idaho,
Montana, Oregon, and Eastern and Western Washington. The Middle
Division would include the districts of Northern and Eastern California,
Hawaii, Nevada, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. The Southern
Division would include the districts of Arizona and Central and
Southern California.5 According to the Commission's recommendation,
each division would have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over matters
heard by its lower courts. 6 Additionally, each division's decisions
would not bind the other two divisions. 7
46. § 305(a)(1)(B)(iii), 111 Stat. at2491.
47. See REPORT, supra note 4, at 1.
48. Justice White was appointed to the United States Supreme Court in 1962 by
President Kennedy.
49. Judge Merritt was appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
in 1977 by President Carter.
50. Judge Rymer was appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in 1989 by President Bush.
51. Judge Browning was appointed to the U.S. District Court for the District of
Arizona in 1984 by President Reagan.
52. Mr. Cooper is a member of the Alabama State Bar Association and formerly
served as president of the American Bar Association. See id. at 1.
53. See id. at 2-3.
54. The Commission's Internet address is <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov>.
55. See REPORT, supra note 4, at 41.
56. See id. Each division would also have exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from
administrative agencies and original proceedings commenced within the division.
57. See id. at 43. But the report does recommend that the decisions of each
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Under the Commission's plan, "[a] majority of judges serving on each
division would be residents of the districts over which that division has
jurisdiction."58  Each division would also include judges that are not
residents of districts within the division's jurisdiction.59 Each division
would have a presiding judge. The chief judge of the entire circuit,
however, "could not simultaneously serve as the presiding judge of a
division. '
To resolve possible conflicts among the divisions, the Commission
recommended the creation of a "Circuit Division for conflict correction,
whose sole mission would be to resolve conflicting decisions between
the regional divisions."'" As such, the Circuit Division would not have
jurisdiction to review a decision of a regional division on the ground that
it is incorrect or unsound.62 The task of reviewing decisions believed to
be incorrect and unsound would be reserved for the regional division
sitting en banc.6' The circuit-wide limited en banc process that presently
exists in the Ninth Circuit would be abolished under the new regime."The Circuit Division would be composed of thirteen judges including
division be "accorded substantial weight as the judges of the circuit endeavor to keep
circuit law consistent." Id.
58. Id. Circuit Judges Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Stephen Trott, Thomas G.
Nelson, Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Sidney R. Thomas, Susan P. Graber, and M. Margaret
McKeown, and Senior Circuit Judges Eugene A. Wright, Otto R. Skopil, Betty Binns
Fletcher, Jerome Farris, Robert R. Beezer, and Edward Leavy would reside in the
Northern Division. Chief Judge Procter Hug, Jr. and Circuit Judges James R. Browning,
Melvin Brunetti, and William A. Fletcher, and Senior Circuit Judges Herbert Y.C. Choy,
Joseph T. Sneed, Charles E. Wiggins, and John T. Noonan, Jr. would reside in the
Middle Division. Circuit Judges Mary M. Schroeder, Harry Pregerson, Stephen
Reinhardt, Alex Kozinski, Ferdinand F. Fernandez, Pamela Ann Rymer, Michael Daly
Hawkins, A. Wallace Tashima, Barry G. Silverman, and Kim McLane Wardlaw, and
Senior Circuit Judges Alfred T. Goodwin, J. Clifford Wallace, Arthur L. Alarcon,
Warren J. Ferguson, Dorothy W. Nelson, William C. Canby, Jr., Robert Boochever,
Cynthia Holcomb Hall, and David R. Thompson would reside in the Southern Division.
59. See id. These judges would be "assigned randomly or by lot for specified
terms of at least three years." Id.
60. Id. The presiding judge of each division will be selected in the same manner in
which the circuit's chief judge is presently selected. See id. Judge O'Scannlain would
preside over the Northern Division, Judge Brunetti would preside over the Middle
Division, and Judge Schroeder would preside over the Southern Division. Judge
Kozinski would likely preside over the Southern Division after Judge Schroeder
becomes Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit.




the chief judge and twelve active circuit judges. 5 The judges would be
"selected by lot in equal numbers from each of the regional divisions"
and would serve terms of three years. 6 The Circuit Division's
jurisdiction would be discretionary and a party-but not a judge-could
invoke it following the decision of a regional division.67 The Circuit
Division, however, would only review a regional division's decision
after the regional en banc had reviewed the allegedly conflicting three-
judge panel decision or after the regional division had denied en banc
recommendation."8
C. Alternative Solutions Considered and Rejected by the Commission
The Commission examined over a dozen proposals for splitting the
Ninth Circuit, but it gave serious consideration to only three other
alternatives for restructuring the court. 9 According to the Commission,
only three alternative proposals had "any geographical integrity, serve[d]
to any extent both the federalizing and regionalizing functions of federal
courts, and [were] consistent with the principle of state contiguity in the
'lower 48' states. ' 70  The Commission rejected two of these options
because they would lead to an inequitable distribution of caseloads
between the proposed new circuits. 1 The Commission rejected the third
alternative proposal because it would result in the division of California
65. See id. As originally proposed in the Draft Report, the Circuit Division was to
be composed of the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit, the presiding judge of each
regional division, and one circuit judge from each division. See DRAFr REPORT, supra
note 7, at 42. The "at large" judges were to be selected under rules promulgated by the
court of appeals as a whole. See id.
As originally conceived, the proposed Circuit Division posed major problems because
every case in the Circuit Division would be heard by a panel of which four of the seven
judges were chosen based on seniority. This very design is inconsistent with any
argument that the present limited en banc system, described in notes 134-136, infra and
accompanying text, does not adequately represent the entire court. The idea of a seven-
member panel with four fixed members, as the Commission originally proposed, is far
less representative than the limited en banc system's design of an eleven-member panel
with only one fixed member. The Commission itself seems to acknowledge this very
problem in its Final Report. See REPORT, supra note 4, at 45 n.102.
66. Id.
67. See REPORT, supra note 4, at 45.
68. For a discussion of the procedure by which the Circuit Division would carry
out its function, see id. at 46. The report also recommends that the Circuit Division
operate under rules promulgated by the Ninth Circuit. The regional divisions would
operate under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
69. For a discussion of other proposals to split the Ninth Circuit, see Diarmuid F.
O'Scannlain, A Ninth Circuit Split Study Commission: Now What?, 57 MONT. L. REv.
313 (1996).
70. REPORT, supra note 4, at 53.
71. See id. at 54-56.
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72
into two separate circuits.
To begin with, the Commission rejected the plan it refers to as a
"[v]ariation on the 'classical split.' ' 73 Under this plan, the new Ninth
Circuit would consist of Arizona, California, and Nevada.74 The new
Twelfth Circuit would include Alaska, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana,
the Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon, and Washington.75  The
Commission rejected this option because of the resulting workload
disparity.7' Under the "variation on the classical split" option, weighted
filings' would increase from 226 to 257 per judgeship for the new Ninth
Circuit, and would decrease to 169 per judgeship for the new Twelfth
Circuit.
78
The Commission also rejected an option combining the classical split
with a realignment of the present Tenth Circuit aimed at reducing the
size of the new Ninth Circuit.79 Under this plan, Arizona would join the
Tenth Circuit,0 and the Ninth Circuit would include California, Nevada,
Hawaii, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. The proposed Twelfth
Circuit would include only Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon and
Washington. The Commission also rejected this plan because of a
72. See id. at 56-57.
73. Id. at 54. The "classical split" is between the Pacific Northwest and Southwest
regions. Under the classical split, the Ninth Circuit would consist of Arizona, California,
Guam, Hawaii, Nevada, and the Northern Mariana Islands. The Twelfth Circuit would




77. After the parties to an appeal file their briefs, "a Ninth Circuit staff attorney in
San Francisco ... assigns the case a weight based on complexity. The cases containing
the simplest issues are assigned a weight of one. The cases containing many complex
issues, termed 'blockbusters,' are rated ten. In-between case weights are three, five, or
seven." Harry Pregerson, The Seven Sins of Appellate Brief Writing and Other
Transgressions, 34 UCLA L. REv. 431,431-32 (1986).
78. See REPORT, supra note 4, at 54. One must wonder why unequal workloads
between two circuits poses such a problem. The workloads of the new Ninth and
Twelfth Circuits would be far greater than many other circuits even if the present Ninth
Circuit could be divided in a way that would keep California intact and still yield even
workloads between the two courts. If Congress resolves to divide the Ninth Circuit-
either internally or outright-we believe that the "variation" option is the most
appropriate path to take.
79. See REPORT, supra note 4, at 55-56.
80. Arizona is the second largest state in the Ninth Circuit in terms of generating
appeals. See id. at 55. Under this plan, the new Tenth Circuit would be composed of
Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming. See id.
resulting disparity in workload."' Under this "variation and shift" plan,
the new Ninth Circuit's filings would rise by approximately fifty
weighted filings per judgeship," but weighted filings would fall by more
than sixty per judgeship in the proposed Twelfth Circuit.83
Finally, the Commission rejected a plan that involved the division of
California into two separate circuits. Under this plan, the new Ninth
Circuit would consist of the districts of Arizona, Southern and Central
California, Hawaii, Nevada, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands.'
The proposed Twelfth Circuit would include the districts of Alaska,
Eastern and Northern California, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Eastern
and Western Washington. 5 This is the same plan as was proposed by
the Hruska Commission and rejected by Congress. The White
Commission rejected this plan because it would result in the
unprecedented division of a state between two federal circuits, even
though it would yield roughly equal caseloads between the two new
circuits .86
Also of interest, the Commission rejected Chief Judge Hug's
suggested modifications to the recommendation contained in the
Commission's Draft Report. 7 Chief Judge Hug suggested that the
Commission retain the proposed three-division plan, but he asked the
Commission to give the decisions of each division's panels stare decisis
effect throughout the entire circuit. Chief Judge Hug considered the
adoption of this recommendation "essential to the maintenance and
81. See id. at 56. This plan may also involve more complexity in terms of
governing law than did the 1980 split of the Fifth Circuit. After its creation, the new
Eleventh Circuit was simply bound by Fifth Circuit precedent that predated October 1,
1981. Moving Arizona into the Tenth Circuit, however, would be far more difficult. To
the extent a Fifth Circuit split model could be followed, Arizona district courts would be
bound by Ninth Circuit decisions prior to the split and Tenth Circuit decisions after the
split. All other districts within the Tenth Circuit would, of course, be bound by Tenth
Circuit law only, as they are presently. In the alternative, Ninth Circuit law could be
wiped out of Arizona completely, with the state being wholly transplanted into the Tenth
Circuit. Arizona would follow Tenth Circuit law to the extent that it conflicts with Ninth
Circuit law. In either case, shifting Arizona into the Tenth Circuit would create a real
headache for Arizona litigants and their attorneys.
82. See id. Projected filings would rise from 226 to an estimated 270 appeals per
judgeship. See id.




86. See id. at 57.
87. See id. at 51. Chief Judge Hug, writing for a majority of the Ninth Circuit's
judges, submitted a commentary on the Draft Report in the form of a five page letter
dated October 29, 1988, to which he attached a twelve-page "Analysis of the
Commission Report." Both can be found on the Commission's website
(http:llapp.comm/uscourts/gov).
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development of the law of a circuit."" In order to accommodate the
Commission's concerns that circuit judges be more closely tied to the
regions in which they sit, Chief Judge Hug proposed that each division
be constituted of two judges resident to the region and one non-resident
judge." This would ensure that judges from a given region render a
"great majority of the decisions that affect that area."9 Chief Judge Hug
also urged the retention of the Ninth Circuit's limited en bane process,
but suggested increasing the number of judges from eleven to thirteen or
fifteen, with an equal number of judges from each division.9'
The Commission rejected Judge Hug's suggestion that the regional
divisions' decisions be given stare decisis effect because the suggestion
runs counter to the Commission's conception of the regional division as
a "regionally based, adjudicative unit that is small enough, stable
enough, and autonomous enough to function effectively as an appellate
decisional body responsible for the law applicable in the region."'
Under Judge Hug's proposal, the regional divisions would function
merely to "channel the calendering process," not to adjudicate
independently of other divisions.93
The Commission also rejected Judge Hug's suggestion regarding
panel composition within each divisional unit as giving "both too much
and too little weight to the value of regional connection." ' It gave too
much weight to regional concerns by "requiring that every panel in the
circuit have a majority of judges from the region that generates the
appeal, implying that only judges from the region can get the law
right."95 According to the Commission, Chief Judge Hug's proposal also
gave too little weight to the value of regional connections by subjecting
a regional panel's decisions to circuit-wide en bane rehearing. The
Commission felt that Chief Judge Hug's suggestion did not enhance the
"regionalizing or federalizing functions that" they sought to
"reconcile."97
88. Hug, supra note 87, at 4.
89. See id. at 3.
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. REPORT, supra note 4, at 51.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 52.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 52.
97. Id.
D. Rationalizing the Commission's Recommendation
At the very outset of its report, the Commission set out its findings
that "the administration of the Ninth Circuit is, at the least, on a par with
that of other circuits" and that the circuit is "innovative in many
respects.""8 The Commission went on to state that it saw "no good
reason to split the circuit solely out of concern for its size or
administration."" Ironically, the Commission later justified its
recommendation that Congress internally divide the Ninth Circuit, in
part, for these same reasons. The Commission advanced three primary
justifications for its proposal: decreasing the Ninth Circuit's rate of
intra-circuit conflict, enhancing the effectiveness of its en banc
processes, and promoting regional connections between judges and the
geographic areas in which they sit.Y
The Commission justified its recommendation on the ground that
smaller decisional units within the circuit would promote consistency
and predictability in the law, despite the Commission's claim that the
Ninth Circuit's size was not a basis for its recommendation. ' The
Commission stated that the large number of opinions presently issued by
the Ninth Circuit makes it difficult for judges to familiarize themselves
with the circuit's law."2 This fact, "along with perceptions of greater
inconsistency in the Ninth Circuit than in most other circuits, confirms
[the Commission's] own judgement, based on experience, that large
appellate units have difficulty developing and maintaining consistent
and coherent law."'
0 3
The Commission also stated that the new divisional regime would
improve the Ninth Circuit's en banc procedures." The Commission
noted that the Ninth Circuit judges surveyed by the Commission
reported dissatisfaction with the frequency of en banc hearings at a
higher rate than judges in most other circuits.' But the Commission
admits that the divisional arrangement it proposes would increase the
frequency of en banc hearings because each division's smaller size
would enable it to convene its own en banc hearings.0 6  The
Commission contemplated that the conflict correcting Circuit Division
would act as another kind of en banc mechanism and "would act
98. Id. at ix.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 47-49.
101. See id. at 47.
102. See id.
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. See id. at 48.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 48-49.
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effectively to choose between articulated conflicting points of view and
quickly settle the law of the circuit."' '
Finally, the Commission justified its recommendation on the ground
that divisions composed of both resident and nonresident judges will
better accommodate "the regional character deemed a desirable feature
of the federal intermediate appellate system, without losing the benefits
of diversity inherent in a court drawn from a larger area."' The
Commission aimed to restore "a sense of connection between the court
and the regions within the circuit by assuring that a majority of the
judges in each division come from the geographic area each division
serves."' 9 The proposed structure at the same time purports to avoid
requiring the President to appoint judges to a particular division because
judges would not be strictly assigned to a particular division.1 The
President could instead continue to appoint judges to the Ninth Circuit in
general."' According to the Commission, maintaining a single circuit
ensures that a single court will "interpret and apply federal law in the
western United States, particularly the federal commercial and maritime
laws that govern relations with the other nations on the Pacific Rim.""1
2
IV. EVALUATION OF THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL
Above all, the Commission's justifications for its recommendation
largely lack empirical support. To the extent the Commission provides
support for its recommendation, the reasons it offers do not warrant the
radical restructuring of the Ninth Circuit that the Commission proposes.
To begin with, no empirical evidence indicates that the Ninth Circuit
suffers a higher rate of intra-circuit inconsistency than that suffered by
smaller circuits. This is true despite any "perceptions" of intra-circuit
inconsistency or the Commission's "own judgment, based on
experience, that large appellate units have difficulty developing and
maintaining consistent and coherent law.""..3  Moreover, the
Commission's assertion that the proposed reorganization will improve
the Ninth Circuit's en banc process is dubious at best. Finally, the
107. Id. at 49.
108. Id.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. Id. at 49-50.
113. Id. at 47.
Commission's goal of enhancing connections between federal judges
and the regions in which they sit is not a legitimate reason for dividing a
circuit.
A. Enhancing Consistency and Coherency of Ninth Circuit Law
The Commission states that the proposed divisional arrangement will
decrease the likelihood of conflicting decisions within the Ninth
Circuit.' 4 The Ninth Circuit is by far the largest of the federal circuits,
and the number of judges in the Ninth Circuit gives rise to numerous
possible combinations for randomly drawn panels of three. Critics
charge that this high number of potential combinations makes it
increasingly difficult for a panel to track cases before other panels and
thereby increases the likelihood that two or more panels considering the
same issue will reach inconsistent results.' 5
Common sense tells us that larger circuits will tend to have a greater
raw number of intra-circuit conflicts than smaller circuits.16 This is due
to the volume of decisions a larger circuit will inevitably publish. But
no objective evidence supports the conclusion that this intuition is
correct, at least with regard to the Ninth Circuit. 17 Quite to the contrary,
one significant empirical study suggests that this assumption is
completely wrong."
114. See id.
115. See Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 EMORY L.J.
1357, 1369 (1995).
116. See Bums, supra note 2, at 251 (noting that the large number of panel
combinations "creates intracircuit conflicts and increases the likelihood of inconsistent
decisions among panels within the circuit").
117. According to Conrad Bums, United States Senator from Montana, "Anecdotal
evidence indicates that the Ninth Circuit is marked by an increased incidence of
intracircuit conflicts." Id. at 252. But Senator Bums fails to set forth any empirical
study suggesting that this "anecdotal evidence" is of any real significance. Indeed, the
Commission all but concedes this very point, complaining that "[i]n the time allotted, [it]
could not possibly have undertaken a statistically meaningful analysis of opinions as well
as unpublished dispositions, dissents, and petitions for rehearing en banc to make [its]
own, objective determination of how the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals measures up to
others" in terms of intra-circuit consistency. REPORT, supra note 4, at 39. Despite this
absence of empirical evidence, the Commission feels perfectly comfortable leaping to
the conclusion that the Ninth Circuit suffers from a problem of intra-circuit inconsistency
based solely on the perceptions of district judges and lawyers in the Ninth Circuit. See
id. at 40. The Commission never questions whether the perceptions ("views and
experiences") of the judges and lawyers reflect reality. See id.
118. See Arthur D. Hellman, Maintaining Consistency in the Law of the Large
Circuit, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE 55, 83-86 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990); see also
David C. Frederick, An Old Argument, THE RECORDER, August 20, 1997, at 5, 7 ("There
is, in fact, no concrete evidence for that assertion [that the Ninth Circuit suffers from a
higher rate of inconsistency than other circuits]. Scholars who have studied the Ninth
Circuit have consistently reported that the problem of intra-circuit conflicts is not greater
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During the years 1986 and 1989, Professor Arthur D. Hellman
conducted a series of empirical studies of Ninth Circuit case law.
Hellman studied between one-fourth and one-fifth of the Ninth Circuit's
published opinions for the years 1983 and 1986 to determine whether
they conflicted with other Ninth Circuit decisions."9 For each case he
studied, Hellman searched for other published cases that reached a
different conclusion.'9 Hellman next determined whether the attorney
for the losing party relied on an "alternate precedent" in making
arguments in support of a result that was ultimately rejected by the
panel. 2' To determine whether the losing attorney relied on the alternate
precedent, Hellman examined whether the district court, a dissenting
judge on appeal, or another circuit accepted the losing party's
argument.' Hellman also considered whether the panel majority itself
expressed a belief in the validity of the argument.'2 If these criteria
suggested that the precedent the losing party relied upon may have given
rise to a conflict, Hellman looked to the clarity and cogency of the panel
majority's opinion to determine whether it provided a sound and
credible rationale for distinguishing the earlier case or otherwise
declining to follow it.24 Professor Hellman ultimately found very few
cases that gave rise to intra-circuit conflict."z
The Hellman study is no doubt dated. But the present relevance of
Professor Hellman's work is that it suggests that, at least in the mid-
1980s, inconsistency among Ninth Circuit decisions was not a problem
of magnitude many perceived it to be. The same may be true today.
Professor Hellman's study at least demonstrates that larger circuits do
not necessarily suffer higher rates of intra-circuit conflict, as the White
Commission has assumed.
Professor Hellman's study is the only comparative study of intra-
circuit inconsistency. The White Commission performed no
comparative study of intra-circuit conflict in the federal courts of
appeals. To reach its conclusion, the Commission instead relied on
"perceptions" of inconsistency in the Ninth Circuit and the "experience"
in the Ninth than in other circuits.").






125. See id. at 86.
of its members.'26 It would be imprudent for Congress to make
fundamental changes to the Ninth Circuit's structure until the White
Commission presents it with at least some objective measure of the level
of inconsistency in Ninth Circuit law. Congress may otherwise be fixing
a problem that does not exist.
In addition, the White Commission appears to have given little weight
to the Ninth Circuit's existing rigorous internal procedures intended to
prevent intra-circuit conflicts. Once appellate briefs are filed, Ninth
Circuit staff attorneys use a detailed issue identification system'21 to
classify the cases.1n The system alerts three-judge panels if a different
panel is considering the same legal issue. 29 In addition, the court's
central staff "disseminate daily reports designed to alert judges to soon-
to-be published opinions and the impact those opinions may have on
pending cases."'3  Finally, whenever possible, appeals concerning
similar issues are calendared before the same panel.'3'
Once a panel has ordered an opinion to be filed, a copy in "slip" form
is circulated to the entire circuit.32 A majority of active circuit judges
"may order that an appeal or other proceeding be heard or reheard by the
court of appeals en banc."'33 In addition, the court's central staff also
reviews all published opinions for potential conflicts, and notifies the
issuing panel if they perceive a consistency problem.
The Ninth Circuit's internal regulation procedures ensure that no
serious problem of intra-circuit consistency develops. Without empirical
data, neither the White Commission nor Congress can determine
whether these measures are in fact successful. And indeed, the only
126. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
127. This identification information accompanies the briefs and record of every case
on appeal.
128. See Hellman, supra note 118, at 57-62; Pregerson, supra note 77, at 431-32.
After the briefs are filed, a Ninth Circuit staff attorney in San Francisco
reviews both the appellant's and the appellee's briefs and prepares a case
inventory. The inventory includes a short summary of the nature of the case
and the issues raised on appeal. To enable the court to monitor cases dealing
with similar issues, a staff attorney assigns an appropriate computer code to
each issue listed in the inventory.
Id.
129. See Hellman, supra note 118, at 58.
130. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Long Range Plan, Court
Operations, 1994-1998 Accomplishments [hereinafter Ninth Circuit Long Range Plan]
(on file with author).
131. See id.; Michael Daly Hawkins, Your Worst Nightmare: Things that Can Go
Bunip on Appeal, LmG., Spring 1996, at 5, 6.
132. See Hellman, supra note 118, at 59.
133. FED. R. APp. P. 35(a). "Such a hearing or rehearing is not favored and
ordinarily will not be ordered except (1) when consideration by the full court is
necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions, or (2) when the proceeding
involves a question of exceptional importance." Id.
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available evidence suggests that they are.
B. Improving the Ninth Circuit's En Banc Process
Parties may seek full court or en banc review of the decision of any
circuit.' 4 When a circuit sits en bane, it generally does so because a
majority of the circuit's judges feel that there might be reason to
overrule a decision of a three-judge panel or to reconsider a prior case
with which the present case is arguably inconsistent. 35 Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 46, any circuit with more than fifteen judges may opt to
conduct its en banc hearings with fewer than all of its members.
36
The White Commission acknowledged that the Ninth Circuit's limited
en banc system has worked well in the past, but stated that the system
can be improved through the Commission's proposed restructuring.
31
The Commission believes that the proposed restructuring would improve
the limited en bane process in two ways: "It would [1] relieve each judge
of having to cope with the decisional output of the entire Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals[,] and [2] reduce the burden of en bane calls to a more
manageable level."'13 Both claims are problematic.
A three-way division of the Ninth Circuit will not reduce the circuit
judges' burden of having to read the opinions of the whole circuit.
Rather, each regional division's judges would have to keep abreast of the
opinions issued by other divisional units if the three divisions are going
to strive in earnest to maintain inter-division, and therefore, intra-circuit
consistency. As such, it is unlikely that the problem of "having to cope
with the decisional output of the entire Ninth Circuit" will be alleviated
134. Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, "[a] party may petition for a
hearing or rehearing en banc." FED. R. APP. P. 35(b).
135. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(1).
136. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1994) ("A court in banc shall consist of all circuit
judges in regular active service, or such number of judges as may be prescribed in
accordance with section 6 of Public Law 95-486."). Section 6 of Public Law 95-486
provides:
Any court of appeals having more than 15 active judges may constitute itself
into administrative units complete with such facilities and staff as may be
prescribed by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and may
perform its en banc function by such number of members of its en banc courts
as may be prescribed by rule of the court of appeals.
Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633.
137. See REPORT, supra note 4, at 48.
138. Id. at48-49.
at all.' If the judges of each division do not remain aware of the other
regions' decisions, the number of inconsistencies generated by the three
divisions could overwhelm the conflict-correcting Circuit Division.
Similarly, there is no reason why the proposed restructuring would
reduce en bane calls to a "manageable" level.14 The Ninth Circuit's
present limited en bane process functions quite well. The process
operates in the following way: if a party suggests that a matter be
reheard en bane, the panel who decided the appeal will notify the other
members of the court of its decision to deny rehearing and whether it
recommends rehearing en bane.
14 1
Upon receipt of the panel's recommendation, any judge has fourteen
days to call for en bane consideration, whereupon a vote will be taken.
If no judge requests or gives notice of an intention to request en bane
consideration within twenty-one days of the receipt of the en bane
suggestion, the panel will enter an order denying rehearing and rejecting
the suggestion for rehearing en bane.'1
4
If a bare majority of nonrecused active judges vote in favor of en
bane, the chief judge issues an order stating that the case is to be reheard
en bane. 43 The members of the en bane panel are selected by a modified
random lot. The chief judge is always a member of the panel and
presides over it. 44 The remaining ten members are selected at random,
with one exception: if any judge has not been selected for the preceding
three en bane panels, that judge is automatically selected.14 1 This
selection process ensures that, despite the whims of fortune, all judges
will participate in the circuit's en bane procedures.
The Ninth Circuit's limited en bane process has been viewed by many
critics as an indication of the problems that come with any circuit having
139. Id. at 48.
140. Moreover, the Commission does not explain or support its implicit assumption
that the number of calls for en bane is presently at a level that can be fairly characterized
as "unmanageable." See REPORT, supra note 4, at 40-49.
141. See 9TH OR. R. 35 advisory committee's note.
142. See id. The advisory committee's note also provides that
[a]ny active judge who is not recused or disqualified and who entered upon
active service before the call for a vote is eligible to vote. A judge who takes
senior status after a call for a vote may not vote or be drawn to serve on en
bane court. This rule is subject to two exceptions: (1) a judge who takes senior
status during the pendency of an en bane case for which the judge has already
been chosen as a member of the en bane court... ; and (2) a senior judge may
elect to be eligible ... to be selected as a member of the en bane court when it
reviews a decision of a panel of which the judge was a member.
Id.
143. See id.
144. See 9TH Cm. R. 35-3. "In the absence of the Chief Judge, an l1th active judge
shall be drawn by lot, and the most senior active judge on the panel shall preside." Id.
145. See id.
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a large number of judges. They argue that a limited en banc panel does
not adequately represent the full circuit bench.'46 It is true that the Ninth
Circuit's limited en bane procedure does not exactly represent the
collective view of the entire circuit. To the extent that it does not, the
possibility of a full court rehearing protects both the parties and the state
of the circuit's law.' 47 Putting aside the possibility of this "super en
bane" review, whether or not the Ninth Circuit's limited en bane
perfectly represents the collective views of the entire circuit is not
entirely relevant. The question is not, and should not be, whether the
limited en bane process precisely reflects the opinions of a majority of
the Ninth Circuit judges. Rather, the issue is whether the Ninth Circuit's
limited en bane process is capable of properly resolving the same
problems that true en bane review is intended to resolve.
48
En bane review is generally employed in order to resolve questions of
inter- or intra-circuit conflict as well as issues of exceptional
importance.' 49 There is no inherent reason that limited en bane panels
cannot adequately resolve both types of questions. Those who insist, as
some have, that all of a circuit's active judges must sit on every en bane
panel' 50 create a trillema: (1) holding en bane hearings with panels of
twenty-one or more judges; (2) perpetually re-dividing circuits to keep
the total number of a circuit's judges within a set limit; or (3) simply
enduring the pressures of growing caseloads with the present number of
circuits and judges. None of these options is particularly palatable. The
third option is untenable because additional circuit judgeships must be
created as population growth and the number of pending appeals
increase over time. The second option might work as a temporary
146. See Bums, supra note 2, at 252 (suggesting that "[t]me en bane review in the
Ninth Circuit is effectively nonexistent, and intracircuit inconsistencies are much more
likely to go unreviewed").
147. See 9TH CIR. R. 35-3 ("In appropriate cases, the Court may order a rehearing
by the full court following a hearing or rehearing en bane."). This procedure has never
been employed by the Ninth Circuit, but it nonetheless exists.
148. En bane review is appropriately suggested by the parties "[w]hen the opinion
of a panel directly conflicts with an existing opinion by another court of appeals and
substantially affects a rule of national application in which there is an overriding need for
national uniformity." Id.
149. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) (En bane review "is not favored and ordinarily will
not be ordered except (1) when consideration by the full court is necessary to secure or
maintain uniformity of its decisions, or (2) when the proceeding involves a question of
exceptional importance.").
150. See Eric J. Gribbin, California Split: A Plan to Divide the Ninth Circuit, 47
DuKE L.J. 351, 378 (1997).
solution, but circuit re-division consistent with population growth will
inevitably lead to more than triple the number of circuits over the next
twenty years. 15  The first option is impractical because it requires the
regular convening of en bane panels of an unwieldy size. Only the
limited en bane procedure presently employed by the Ninth Circuit
provides a workable long-term solution.
52
By all indications, the Ninth Circuit's limited en bane has been a
success. To begin with, no objective evidence suggests that the Ninth
Circuit's rate of intra-circuit conflict is measurably higher than that of
other circuits. 53 Thus, if maintaining intra-circuit consistency is the
purpose of en bane rehearings, it is reasonable to conclude that the Ninth
Circuit's limited en bane has succeeded, or at least that it has not
failed."5 Moreover, as Chief Judge Hug notes, judges and attorneys-
those most directly affected by the Ninth Circuit's system of limited en
banc-generally express satisfaction with the process.'55 There is no
reason to believe that the Ninth Circuit's en bane system is not
functioning well or that the Commission's proposal will necessarily
improve it.
C. Increasing Regional Connections
According to the Commission, restructuring the Ninth Circuit would
enhance the connections between judges and the geographic regions in
which they sit.'56 This statement echoes the criticisms of those who have
long advocated an outright split of the Ninth Circuit. Long-time critics
of the "political makeup" of the Ninth Circuit argue that the Ninth
Circuit is dominated by California judges who do not appreciate the
peculiar character of the Pacific Northwest, and who, as a consequence,
do not adequately consider that region's interests.'57
If this criticism is rooted in frustration with the judicial appointments
of Presidents long since past, it is an illegitimate reason to restructure a
federal court of appeals. And if this criticism is not simply political, it is
151. It is estimated that if circuits were limited to 12-15 judges, we would have
nearly 40 circuits by the year 2020. See Lloyd D. George, The Split of the Ninth Circuit:
Is It Really Our Best Option?, NEV. LAW., June 6, 1998, at 5, 5.
152. See generally Frederick, supra note 118, at 4 ("The trends suggest that
virtually every other circuit will have to copy that idea or come up with some efficient
alternative.").
153. See supra notes 1157-25 and accompanying text.
154. See Proctor Hug, Jr., The Ninth Circuit Should Not Be Split, 57 MoNT. L. REv.
291, 298 (1996) ("Since 1980, the Ninth Circuit's use of a limited en banc court to
resolve intracircuit conflicts has proven highly effective.").
155. See id. at 298-99.
156. See REPORT, supra note 4, at 49.
157. See Tobias, supra note 115, at 1371-77; Hellman, supra note 32, at 282.
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open to attack on several fronts, not the least of which is that it is based
on a fundamental misconception about the role of our federal courts.
1. Debunking the Myth of "California Judging"
California is the most populous state in the Ninth Circuit and most
Ninth Circuit appeals emanate from lower courts in California. But
there is no reason to believe that any "California judging" phenomenon
exists, much less California domination.' 5  Moreover, the Ninth
Circuit's composition and existing panel selection procedures make even
the possibility of domination by any one region highly unlikely. To
begin with, some circuit judges presently residing in California actually
hail from less populous states within the Ninth Circuit, just as some of
the judges in the less populous states originally resided in California.59
Moreover, the myth that California judges dominate the Ninth Circuit is
debunked when one considers the percentage of Ninth Circuit judges
who reside in states other than California. In 1997, only eight of the
twenty-one active Ninth Circuit judges resided in California, despite the
fact that 5,306 of the 8,651 Ninth Circuit filings originated in
California.' 60 Therefore, California had only 38% of the judges, but
generated 61% of the caseload.16 ' As such, a great many more cases
affecting Californians were decided by "non-California" judges than
were non-California cases decided by "California" judges. At least for
1997, Californians have the stronger claim of inadequate representation
on the circuit's bench. The fact is that California only dominates the
Ninth Circuit in that the greatest number of appeals originate there. And
this fact is irrelevant to the argument that California judges do not
adequately consider the interests of the citizens of California's
neighboring states.
158. See Baker, supra note 11, at 942 ("To date, no one has tried to correlate
decisions with the geographic origins of the judges in order to test the validity of the
California stereotype.... The complaint that California judges dominate [the Ninth
Circuit] has never been proven.").
159. For example, Judge James R. Browning sits in San Francisco, California, but
was born and educated in Montana. Judge Alfred T. Goodwin served on the Oregon
Supreme Court and Judge Robert Boochever served on the Alaska Supreme Court; both
currently sit in Pasadena, California. Judge Stephen S. Trott sits in Boise, Idaho, but
spent most of his career as a prosecutor in Los Angeles, California. See Hellman, supra
note 32, at 283.
160. See George, supra note 151, at 5, 23.
161. See id.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's panel selection procedures make
California domination highly unlikely. The computerized random panel
selection process employed by the Ninth Circuit is designed to assign
each circuit judge to sit with each other circuit judge an equal number of
times.'6 This system ensures that three judges from the same state rarely
sit together on a panel.'63 One must also keep in mind that the area
covered by the vast expanse of California's boundaries is hardly
monolithic. The Golden State is rich with a diversity of differing local
cultures and regional attitudes. Therefore, one could ask: Which
California supposedly dominates?
2. Promoting Judicial Regionalism: A Misconception of the Role of
Our Federal Courts
The Commission's argument that the Ninth Circuit should be divided
based on regional lines "rest[s] on fundamental misconceptions about
the role of the federal courts of appeals in our legal system." 6' A central
"reason for the existence of' the federal courts' federal question and
maritime jurisdictions is to foster uniform interpretation of federal law
across the nation. It is the responsibility of the United States Courts of
Appeals to ensure that federal law is so interpreted.' 65 To create circuit
divisions according to the character of each region of the country would
inevitably result in very different and particularized interpretations of
federal law between circuits and even within each circuit, thereby
undermining the court's mission to uniformly interpret the law.'66
Moreover, the Commission's assertion that federal judges should have
a close connection with their local regions conflicts with the concept of
diversity jurisdiction-a door to the federal courts which Congress has
time and again refused to close.' 67 The diversity jurisdiction of the
federal courts exists out of concern that state courts, closely connected to
local interests, would be unfairly biased against the interests of out-of-
staters, even if unintentionally so. Federal judges are expected to
balance the interests of local and out-of-state interests and to dispense
justice with an even hand. To divide a circuit or to create internal
divisions within a circuit is to increase the probability that the federal
courts will fall into precisely the situation that the creation of their
162. See 9TH C. R. at xviii.
163. See Baker, supra note 11, at 941-42.
164. Hellman, supra note 32, at 283.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 283-84.
167. See Frederick, supra note 118, at 4 ("The notion that courts of appeals should
be closer to the people also runs counter to the purpose behind the creation of the circuit
court system 100 years ago.").
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diversity jurisdiction was intended to prevent.
The Commision's manifest intention to promote a kind of judicial
regionalism by creating internal divisions of the Ninth Circuit is exactly
the wrong reason for restructuring a court of appeals. Moreover,
because there is no evidence that the State of California or "California
judging" in fact dominates the Ninth Circuit, a restructuring of the court
over regionalism concerns is seriously misguided. Other than a dislike
for the personal-as opposed to regional-ideas of some circuit judges
who presently reside in California, there is simply no reason to believe
that the existing structure of the Ninth Circuit is undesirable from the
perspective of citizens of the Pacific Northwest. On the other hand,
there is every reason to believe that restructuring the court with the
specific intention of accommodating regional concerns will undercut the
function and purpose of our federal appellate courts.
D. Other Disadvantages of the Proposed Reorganization
The Commission is to be commended as much for what it did not do
as for what it did. Namely, the Commission does not advocate the
outright division of the Ninth Circuit into two circuits. But the
Commission does propose to divide the circuit internally. And under
this plan, intra-circuit consistency is more likely to suffer than to be
cured. To the extent that regions within the Ninth Circuit are already
politically polarized,'68  "political differences" will have greater
168. Judges in the Southern region of the present Ninth Circuit have often been
accused of having liberal tendencies. To the extent that the party affiliations of the
Presidents who appointed each of these judges is relevant, judges of the proposed
Southern Division who were appointed by Democrats outnumber those appointed by
Republicans nearly two to one. Southern Division active judges appointed by Democrats
outnumber those appointed by Republicans seven to three. Circuit Judges Schroeder
(Carter), Pregerson (Carter), Reinhardt (Carter), Kozinski (Reagan), Fernandez
(Reagan), Rymer (Bush), Hawkins (Clinton), Tashima (Clinton), Silverman (Clinton),
and Wardlaw (Clinton), and Senior Circuit Judges Goodwin (Nixon), Wallace (Nixon),
Alarcon (Carter), Ferguson (Carter), D. Nelson (Carter), Canby (Carter), Boochever
(Carter), Hall (Reagan), and Thompson (Reagan) reside in the proposed Southern
Division.
The remainder of the circuit is relatively balanced based on the party of the appointing
President. In the proposed Middle Division, Republican appointments outnumber
Democrat appointments five to three. Among active judges, Democrat appointments
outnumber Republican appointments three to one. Chief Judge Hug (Carter) and Circuit
Judges Browning (Kennedy), Brunetti (Reagan), and W. Fletcher (Clinton), and Senior
Circuit Judges Choy (Nixon), Sneed (Nixon), Wiggins (Reagan), and Noonan (Reagan)
reside in the proposed Middle Division.
significance among the proposed circuit divisions.
According to the Commission's proposal, the internal divisions are to
have exclusive jurisdiction over appeals originating within their
bounds.'69 Moreover, a division's decisions will not bind the other two
divisions.' This arrangement encourages judges to decide cases based
on inclinations other than circuit precedent because they will no longer
be bound by the case law of the entire circuit. As such, the proposed
regime will either generate a considerable volume of work for the
proposed conflict-correcting Circuit Division or create three de facto
circuits, or both.
The Commission's proposed arrangement for resident and nonresident
judges within each division is also problematic. Under the proposed
regime, a majority of a division's judges will reside within the division
in which they sit.'7' A minority will reside outside the division. The
proposal thus creates two classes of judges within each division-
regional insiders and regional outsiders. If the Commission's
assumptions about the importance of regional connections are accurate,
regional outsiders will more often find themselves in the dissent than
will the regional insiders. Outsider judges will also be put to more
inconvenience in terms of the need to travel to panel sittings in distant
locations. As such, an outsider judge is likely to be an outsider not only
in the regional but also in the metaphorical sense. Collegiality between
judges of different divisions will undoubtedly suffer.
The Commission's proposed en banc structure also press daunting
problems when considered together with the exclusive nature of each
division's jurisdiction over appeals from lower tribunals within its
bounds. Under the Commission's plan, the only circuit-wide en banc
review available would be by the Circuit Division. And the Circuit
Division would only have jurisdiction to review decisions in cases of
inter-divisional conflicts, and not where the division of a three-judge
panel or a division sitting en banc is incorrect or unsound. The proposed
regime potentially leaves the Ninth Circuit-if one is still justified in
calling it that-with no effective mechanism to uniformly settle issues of
significance to the entire circuit. According to Chief Judge Hug, "[tihis
In the proposed Northern Division, Democrat appointments outnumber Republican
appointments seven to six. Among active judges, Republican appointments outnumber
Democrat appointments four to three. Circuit Judges O'Scannlain (Reagan), Trott
(Reagan), T. Nelson (Bush), Kleinfeld (Bush), Thomas (Clinton), Graber (Clinton), and
McKeown (Clinton), and Senior Circuit Judges Wright (Johnson), Skopil (Carter), B.
Fletcher (Carter), Farris (Carter), Beezer (Reagan), and Leavy (Reagan) reside in the
proposed Northern Division.
169. See REPORT, supra note 4, at 41.
170. See id. at 43.
171. See id.
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would be a particular problem between the Middle and Southern
Divisions, which divide the State of California."' 2 Chief Judge Hug
illustrates the potentially troublesome consequences of this with a
hypothetical:
If proposition 200 were declared to be unconstitutional by the Middle Division,
and if certiorari were denied by the United States Supreme Court, that would be
the rule for the Northern District of California. Unless a conflict were to arise
in the Southern Division by a separate lawsuit being brought, that ruling of the
Middle Division NW9pld remain intact for the Middle Division, but not for the
Southern Division.
The Commission's proposal risks the "balkanization" of the Ninth
Circuit.
The Commission has, through its proposal, sacrificed the interests of
thirty million Californians in favor of maintaining an even workload
among its three new de facto circuits. Proponents of the Commission's
recommendation will surely be quick to point out that under the
Commission's plan all of California is still within one circuit. But the
Commission's refusal to give divisional decisions stare decisis effect
throughout the circuit will effectively place California in two separate
circuits. Given the new plan's significant potential for divergent
interpretations of federal law among the Ninth Circuit's divisions,'74 the
citizens of California will be subject to the law of two divisions with
potentialy inconsistent decisions.
V. COMMON CRITICISMS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT NOT
ADDRESSED BY THE COMMISSION
Proponents of Ninth Circuit division also justify their cause with
criticisms beyond those addressed by the White Commission. These
criticisms can be grouped into two broad categories-administrative and
political 7 5 Those who propose restructuring for administrative reasons
argue that the Ninth Circuit is simply too large to handle its caseload
effectively. 7 6 Those who criticize the Ninth Circuit on political grounds
argue that the court is dominated by liberal California judges who force
their collective judicial will upon the less populous, more conservative
172. Hug, supra note 87, at 4.
173. Id.
174. See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
175. See Savage, supra note 1, at A3.
176. See Bums, supra note 2, at 250-5 1.
states within the circuit.'77 These critics generally cite the Ninth
Circuit's high rate of reversal by the Supreme Court as evidence that the
Ninth Circuit is out of touch with mainstream American judicial
philosophy. A careful analysis of each of theses two criticisms reveals
that both are groundless and lack empirical foundation.
A. The Sheer Expanse of the Ninth Circuit's Boundaries Is Reason to
Divide It Only if Size Results in Other Problems
The Ninth Circuit spans nine states inhabited by more than fifty-one
million people.' The court presently has twenty-eight authorized
judgeships,' eleven more than the next largest circuit'" and sixteen
more than the average of the other circuits.'' The Ninth Circuit is
presently staffed by twenty-one active circuit judges and nineteen senior
circuit judges. Between April 1, 1994, and March 31, 1995, the Ninth
Circuit decided 7,955 matters. In the same period ending in 1997, the
Ninth Circuit decided 8,701 matters.' 82 This upward trend will likely
continue as the population continues to grow. Approximately 50,000
appeals were filed in the federal courts in 1995. By 2020, that number is
expected to reach 350,000. '83
In addition to an alleged increase in intra-circuit conflicts, critics
charge that the Ninth Circuit's size gives rise to both a slowness in
resolving appeals and a lack of collegiality among judges. But the
available evidence suggests that the Ninth Circuit suffers from neither
problem. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has instituted procedures to deal
with these problems to the extent that either problem threatens the
court's work.
1. The Ninth Circuit's Size Has Not Resulted in a Lack of Expediency
in Resolving Appeals
The Ninth Circuit has been criticized as the slowest circuit in the
country, requiring a median time of fourteen and one-half months to
process an appeal.' The circuit's size has been blamed as the cause of
177. See Rex Bossert, The Call for Dividing the 9th Circuit Grows, NAT'L L.J., May
5, 1997, at Al; Savage, supra note 1, at A3.
178. See Savage, supra note 1, at A3.
179. See 28 U.S.C. § 44 (1994).
180. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals is authorized 17 judgeships. See id.
181. See Tobias, supra note 115, at 1367.
182. See Jerome Farris, The Ninth Circuit-Most Maligned Circuit in the Country-
Fact or Fiction?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1465, 1465 (1997).
183. See "Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts" of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, 1995, at 161.
184. See Baker, supra note 11, at 936; see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 39, at 9
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these delays.' But these statistics are misleading because each appeal
spends only a fraction of the time required to process it in a judges'
chambers.8 6 The Ninth Circuit's median time of 1.8 months from
submission of a case to its disposition equals that of the three fastest
federal circuits and is .4 months faster than the average of all circuits.'7
The remainder of the time required to process an appeal is generally
spent by attorneys and court reporters preparing briefs and case
records. 8
Unfilled judgeships, rather than circuit size, is more likely the reason
why the Ninth Circuit lags behind the national average in the time
elapsed from an appeal's filing to its final disposition.89 The Ninth
Circuit presently has twenty-eight authorized judgeships, but only
twenty-one active judges.90 This understaffing results in the court's
inability to assemble panels to hear cases which are ready for and
awaiting hearing and decision."'
In addition, the Bay Area earthquake of 1991-which seriously
damaged the court's San Francisco headquarters and thereby created a
("it takes about four months longer to complete an appeal in our court as compared to the
national median time") (quoting written testimony of then-Chief Judge J. Clifford
Wallace).
185. See Bums, supra note 2, at 251 ("Many have cited the court's enormous size as
a factor in the court's inability to process the large number of cases filed in the circuit
each year.").
186. See Baker, supra note 11, at 936.
187. See Hug, supra note 154, at 297.
188. See id. (noting that the Ninth Circuit has high levels of effectiveness and
productivity as measured by one of the highest rates of reasoned, written decisions).
189. See id. at 292; see also Frederick, supra note 118 (noting that a shortage of
judges being nominated and confirmed, not a large circuit, is the reason why cases are
not being handled quickly enough).
190. In addition to these 21 active judges, President Clinton has nominated U.S.
District Judge Richard Paez and attorneys Marsha Berzon, Ronald Gould, Barry P.
Goode and Chief Justice Barbara Durham to fill vacant seats on the Ninth Circuit. None
have yet been confirmed. See Clinton Nominates Conservative Judge for Appeals Court,
ASSOCIATED PRESS POLICAL SERVICE, Jan. 26, 1999, available in 1999 WL 3112140.
Judge Paez, a former Legal Aid Foundation attorney, serves in the Central District of
California. Marsha Berzon is a partner in the San Francisco union-side labor firm of
Altshuler, Berzon, Nussbaum, Berzon & Rubin. Ronald Gould is former president of the
Washington Bar Association and is a partner in the Seattle office of Perkins Coie. Barry
P. Goode is a former special assistant to Senator Adlai E. Stevenson and is a partner in
the San Francisco law firm McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen. Chief Justice
Durham serves on the Supreme Court of Washington. President Clinton nominated
Chief Justice Durham, considered a conservative, as he promised in "return for the
Senate's long-delayed confirmation... of [Judge] William Fletcher." Id.
191. See Hug, supra note 154, at 292.
case backlog-has significantly contributed to the length of time needed
to process an appeal.'92 Disposition time has improved as the court has
worked to reduce this backlog, notwithstanding the shortage of judges.'93
To the extent that a circuit's size causes significant delays in the time
required to dispose of an appeal, one could reasonably expect delays in
disposing of appeals among the larger circuits and relative speed among
the smaller ones. But the Commission cites no empirical data that
demonstrates correlation between circuit size and speed in processing
appeals. Furthermore, if circuit size is determinative, no manner of
dividing a circuit would solve the problem because it simply divides the
work.'94 The better solution to timeliness issues in the Ninth Circuit is to
add more active judges, not to divide the circuit and its workload.9
2. The Ninth Circuit's Size Has Not Caused a Loss of Collegiality
Among Its Judges
Critics also argue that the Ninth Circuit's size has resulted in a loss of
collegiality among its judges.' 6 As the number of circuit judges
increases, it becomes increasingly difficult for judges to get to know one
another and develop relationships, or so the argument goes.' 9, A lack of
collegiality supposedly decreases the likelihood that judges will
compromise on non-essential aspects of a case, thereby increasing the
likelihood of conflicts between judges.9 In time, the lack of collegiality
detrimentally affects the smooth functioning of the court.'9
Collegiality will inevitably suffer on some level as any group grows in
size. But improvements in telecommunications technologies diminishes
the magnitude of that loss in the Ninth Circuit and other courts of
appeals.2 O Video- and tele-conferencing allow multiple individuals to
192. See id. at 297.
193. See id.
194. See generally George, supra note 151, at 23 (noting that larger circuits have
many advantages over smaller circuits with regard to case management and stating that
"in the context of federal circuit management and growth, bigger may be better").
195. See generally id. (stating that no true assessment of the Ninth Circuit's
performance can take place with seven of 28 seats vacant, and noting that the Judicial
Conference of the United States in 1997 recommended that Congress approve 10
additional judgeships for the Ninth Circuit).
196. See Diarmuid O'Scannlain, A Ninth Circuit Split Is Inevitable, But Not




200. See Robert C. Mueller, Finding a System of Courts that Work, FED. LAw., July
1998, at 2, 6, 26 ("Any impediments to collegiality and the ability to confer will be
obviated by advances in videoconference technology, along with electronic mail. These
tools will provide the judiciary with the ability to instantly communicate drafts, discuss
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have conversations from anywhere within the circuit and even beyond."'
This is admittedly not the same as face-to-face communication,2 but
dividing the circuit is also not necessarily the answer. If the circuit were
split or internally divided tomorrow, Judge Sidney Thomas, who sits in
Billings, Montana, would likely not often have an in-person
conversation with Judge Andrew Kleinfeld, who sits in Fairbanks,
Alaska.
Moreover, the judges of the Ninth Circuit-those closest to this
collegiality issue--generally do not agree that the circuit's collegiality
has suffered as the circuit has grown in number of judges. According to
Judge Michael Daly Hawkins, who joined the Ninth Circuit in 1994,
"[c]ollegiality is alive and well in the Ninth Circuit. With the possible
exception of former U.S. Marines, I have never encountered a group of
people who, regardless of background or point of view, treat one another
with such civility and decency. Chief Judge Procter Hug, Jr., who
joined the court in 1977, echoes the same feelings.0
Distance itself is not the real threat to collegiality. Rather, the
challenge lies in the potential for less frequent contact among judges.
Judges who sit together less often will inevitably interact less. And such
less-frequent interaction will result under the White Commission's
proposal to internally divide the Ninth Circuit.
B. The Supreme Court's Reversal Rate of the Ninth Circuit
Some have argued that circuit division will reduce the Supreme
Court's reversal rate of the Ninth Circuit.205 They cite the court's
differences, and interact with one's fellow judges on a real-time basis.").
201. See Baker, supra note 11, at 953 (stating that "[m]odern communications link
chambers in San Francisco and Honolulu almost as instantaneously and just as reliably
as two chambers on different floors of the same courthouse."). The Ninth Circuit
courthouses in San Francisco and Pasadena are presently capable of video-conferencing.
Many United States courthouses in cities where Ninth Circuit judges reside are similarly
capable. For example, video-conferencing facilities are presently operational in Phoenix,
Arizona; Los Angeles, Santa Ana, and Riverside, California; Boise, Idaho; Billings,
Montana; Las Vegas and Reno, Nevada; and Portland, Oregon.
202. But see J. Clark Kelso, A Report on the California Appellate System, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 433, 485 (1993) ("Although technology will permit appellate judges to be
geographically dispersed, a careful and refined transition will insure use of telepresence
is achieved over time without abandoning the face-to-face collegiality.").
203. Hug, supra note 154, at 299-300.
204. See id. at 299.
205. See Baker, supra note 11, at 943.
relatively high reversal rate as an indication that the circuit has grown
too large."06
Even assuming that the Supreme Court's reversal rate of the Ninth
Circuit is of significance,' it does not follow that internally dividing or
otherwise reorganizing the court would reduce its reversal rate. If
Congress voted to divide the circuit outright, thereby forming a new
Twelfth Circuit encompassing the allegedly more "conservative" states
of the Pacific Northwest, the reversal rate of a relatively more "liberal"
Ninth Circuit would remain as high or might even rise. This is because
the allegedly "liberal" tendencies of the new Ninth Circuit would no
longer be tempered by more "conservative" judges who many see as
mitigating the present reversal rate "problem."
In addition, the idea of dividing or restructuring a circuit to improve
its reversal rate is unwise because a circuit's composition, as well as that
of the Supreme Court, is temporary and far from immutable. Changes in
the composition of any appellate court would have the potential to
dramatically decrease or increase a "liberal" or "conservative" court's
reversal rate."' A circuit's reversal rate is simply too transient a variable
on which to base a proposal to divide or fundamentally reorganize a
circuit.21°
A circuit's reversal rate has more to do with the judicial and political
philosophies of the individual judges of a circuit than it does with the
circuit's overall structural form.21 ' Furthermore, all of the participants in
the debate over whether the Ninth Circuit should be reorganized agree-
at least publicly-that it is fundamentally wrong to restructure the court
in an attempt to "fix" perceived differences of political philosophies of
206. See Farris, supra note 182, at 1465 (noting that in 1997, the Supreme Court
accepted 29 Ninth Circuit decisions for review and reversed 28; in 1996, the Court
reviewed 12 decisions and reversed 10; and in 1995, the Court reviewed 14 decisions
and reversed 10).
207. See id. (questioning the significance of the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate in light
of the large number of cases decided by the court).
203. See generally Baker, supra note 11, at 943-44 (noting that "[d]ividing the Fifth
Circuit did not appreciably affect the number of cases claiming Supreme Court review
from the regions of the new Fifth and Eleventh Circuits").
209. See id. at 942.
210. See id. at 944 (stating that the argument that the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate
warrants its division "may prove ultimately only that labelling any bench as large as the
Ninth Circuit must be a gross generalization and at best only temporarily accurate").
211. See id. ("At least in part, these arguments appear to be efforts to justify an
underlying political goal to shift the direction of law in the Ninth Circuit,
notwithstanding protests to the contrary."); see, e.g., Frederick, supra note 118, at 7
("Timber interests from the Pacific Northwest have been lobbying to divide the Ninth
Circuit for years, ever since Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act and the
circuit started handling the most important cases arising under that law and other
environmental laws.").
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the judges who currently sit on the circuit's bench.1 2 Moreover, to
restructure a court based on the existence of political differences flies in
the face of our federal government's separation of powers arrangement.
The federal judiciary was quite deliberately designed to be insulated
from politics. 23  Political pressures certainly do bear upon the court
system, but to manipulate the judiciary in order to quell political
frustrations violates the foundational principles of our government's
third branch.
VI. REFOCUSING THE DEBATE: THE REAL PROBLEM FACED BY THE
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
A. The Workload Crisis: A Threat to Appellate Justice
The increase in the Ninth Circuit's workload in recent years, and the
projected continued increase, is the court's most serious problem.21 4 This
problem, however, is not unique to the Ninth Circuit. Other circuits
have experienced and will continue to experience substantial increases in
caseload.25 A study of the workload problem that focuses exclusively or
primarily on the Ninth Circuit is therefore misguided. The Ninth
Circuit's innovative and highly successful efforts to combat this
problem, on the other hand, can serve as a model to other circuits by
instructing them how to alleviate and overcome their workload crises.
The approach of Congress and of the White Commission to restructure
the federal courts of appeals is fundamentally misguided, as both have
focused on the Ninth Circuit as emblematic of the United States Courts
212. See REPORT, supra note 4, at 6 ("Views about the merits or correctness of
specific judicial decisions or about individual judges presently serving on a court are
transient matters-and are inappropriate bases for constructing long-range institutional
arrangements.").
213. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) ("The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in
a limited constitution.").
214. See Baker, supra note 11, at 938 ("Workload, not size, is the problem of the
Ninth Circuit."). "There is a fundamental problem facing the federal court system. The
number of cases filed in federal courts has increased dramatically in the last twenty
years. This is due to the increase in population and also to the increased number of
issues that now fall within federal jurisdiction." Hug, supra note 154, at 291.
215. See Thomas E. Baker, U.S. Courts of Appeals: Problems and Solutions, FED.
LAW., Aug. 1998, at 30, 31 (stating that "federal appellate dockets continue to grow and
future projections are for greater and greater numbers of appeals for the foreseeable
future").
of Appeals' problems. Rather, the Ninth Circuit should be recognized as
illuminating the path to future solutions for all courts of appeals." 6
The federal appellate docket has grown tremendously in the last forty
years."' "[P]rojections for the future are Malthusian.' '218 From 1960 to
1990, the number of appeals in the circuit courts of appeals increased
from approximately 4,000 to approximately 40,000.29 From 1989 to
1995, the number of appeals filed increased by 26%, while the number
of judges remained the same-16720 The causes of this explosion in
federal appellate dockets can be difficult to identify,' but there is no
evidence that this upward trend will abate in the future.
The increase in the number of cases per judge represents a serious and
real threat to appellate justice?2 Logically, the more cases a judge must
process and decide, the less time he or she can devote to each case.
This, of course, creates the potential danger that judges will, for sheer
lack of time, be unable to thoroughly consider all the issues presented by
an appeal.m There is also the risk that judges will give undue deference
216. See Baker, supra note 11, at 953 ("The Ninth Circuit... may be better viewed
as a harbinger than an aberration.... Rather than divide the Ninth Circuit to make two
new courts that soon will resemble the beleaguered other circuits, Congress ought to hold
the mirror the other way.").
217. See Christopher F. Carlton, The Grinding Wheel of Justice Leaves Some
Grease: Designing the Federal Courts of the Twenty-First Century, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 1, 1 (1997) ("Although the dockets have increased at all levels of the judicial
system, the most acute concerns have centered on the federal appellate courts."); see also
Hug, supra note 154, at 292 ("A study by the Federal Judicial Center in 1989 pointed out
that the caseload per circuit judge increased 347% from 1960 to 1989, whereas the
caseload per district judge increased 35.6%.").
218. Baker, supra note 215, at 31.
219. See id.
220. Appellate filings increased from 37,734 to 50,072. See Hug, supra note 154.
The number of appeals filed declined from 50,224 in 1993 to 48,322 in 1994, but since
1994 it has rebounded to 52,319. See id.
221. See Carlton, supra note 217, at 2 (stating that caseload has continued to
increase in the 1980s and 1990s "even as the Burger and Rehnquist courts have eroded
some of [the] ... liberal precedents" of the Warren Court and noting that "Congress has
been assigned some of the blame for the increased caseload because it has created a
multitude of new federal judicial rights which have had the concomitant impact of
augmenting the federal caseload"); see also Hug, supra note 154, at 291 (speculating that
the increase in caseload is "due to the increase in population and also to the increased
number of issues that now fall within federal jurisdiction").
222. See Carlton, supra note 217, at 2.
223. See id.
224. See id.; see also Baker, supra note 215, at 32 (stating that one of the perceived
problems of growth in the appellate dockets is that "the procedural shortcuts
implemented by the various courts of appeals[] have unreasonably degraded the quality
of federal appellate justice[;]" specifically, "[w]e have gotten too far away from the
procedures of the Learned Hand era, when every appeal was fully briefed, orally argued,
and decided collegially by a three-judge panel with a published opinion written by a
judge").
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to the primary decision maker from whom the appeal is taken-
thereby undermining the purpose of appellate review. A large volume of
cases can also give rise to delays for the litigants,6 resulting in increased
hardship to them and a longer wait for finality and repose.27 Professor
Baker, among others, has suggested that there is also a danger that, with
so many cases, judges may be tempted to delegate more and more
authority to staff, namely law clerks and central staff attorneys, resulting
in a kind of "law clerk justice." '
Dividing or restructuring the Ninth Circuit will not remedy its
intensifying caseload problem. Dividing a circuit, and thereby simply
dividing its caseload, does not reduce the number of cases the two
circuits or two or more divisions must process. The two new circuits
will each still have the same number of combined cases that the old
circuit previously handled alone. Division also does nothing to deal
with the projected increase in caseload that each new circuit or division
will face in the future. Dividing a circuit merely forces the two new
circuits to manage their respective caseload crises individually, resulting
in the unnecessary duplication of administrative effort. "9 The Fifth
Circuit's 1980 division, for example, failed to address that circuit's
workload problem. ° Within five years of its division, the Fifth Circuit's
caseload "reached the pre-division crisis level of filings.""1 It is clear
that circuit division will not solve the caseload problem. As such, other
alternatives must be explored.
225. See Carlton, supra note 217, at 2.
226. See id.
227. See Baker, supra note 215, at 32.
228. See id.
229. See Baker, supra note 11, at 946 (stating that "circuit-splitting does not solve
the problems of one circuit and merely postpones solution of the problems of two"); see
also Tobias, supra note 115, at 1416 ("Bifurcation will not remedy most complications
that the Ninth Circuit in particular, and the appellate system in general, will confront in
the twenty-first century.... [But it] would eliminate the best appellate court for
experimenting with solutions to the problems faced by large circuits.").
230. See Baker, supra note 11, at 927-28 ("Redrawing the circuit boundaries... did
absolutely nothing to relieve the press of the caseload."); see also Tobias, supra note
115, at 1362 ("Creating two circuits [from the old Fifth Circuit] ... failed to relieve
docket pressures. In less than half a decade, the new Fifth Circuit had encountered the
same crisis level of appeals that it had experienced before division.").
231. Baker, supra note 11, at 928 (noting that in March, 1990, the Eleventh Circuit
Judicial Council "reached the point of passing a formal and unanimous resolution...
asking Congress not to add any more circuit judgeships, despite statistical-caseload
justifications, because that court of appeals simply would grow too large").
B. Non-Circuit Dividing Alternatives
Scholars studying the structure of our federal courts of appeals have
suggested several alternatives to circuit division. But their proposals are
designed to remedy the present crisis in the federal circuits. But these
proposed courses of action seem somewhat drastic, even given the
considerable problems faced by federal appellate courts today. We
nevertheless briefly consider these alternative proposals here.
Some commentators have suggested that if the benefits of having a
large circuit are so significant, Congress should consider simply
consolidating all the federal courts of appeals.f2 This proposal would,
by definition, eliminate inter-circuit conflicts. Rather, existing inter-
circuit conflicts would be converted to intra-circuit conflicts.2' The
administrative mechanisms the Ninth Circuit has instituted have
maintained a low rate of intra-circuit conflicts, but even the Ninth
Circuit's procedures may not work in a circuit suddenly quintupled in
size. At the very least, there would be a significant period of transition.
The current structure of geographic circuit organization has worked well.
Therefore, the idea of a single court of appeals is not a realistic solution
to today's problems, whether or not it has theoretical medt.2m The
primary problem facing the appellate courts is the exponential growth in
caseload, and no structural reorganization will remedy that problem.
Other suggestions have included allowing the appellate courts
discretionary review of appeals, or creating district court appellate
divisions for error correction.f 5 Under the former option, courts of
appeals would have discretionary review of appeals.26 This option
232. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 115, at 1398 (stating that consolidation "would
eliminate [inter-circuit) conflicts among appellate courts," but would result in "enhanced
intra-circuit inconsistency"); see also Thomas E. Baker, Imagining the Alternative
Futures of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 GA. L. RnV. 913, 959-60 (1994) (stating that
"a single, unified national court of appeals [would] eliminate .... intercircuit conflict[,]"
but "would require some appropriate mechanism to deal with the... inevitability of
more numerous intracircuit conflicts").
233. See Baker, supra note 11, at 960. Baker believes that in 'a single appellate
mega-circuit there "[I]ogically... could be no such thing as an intercircuit conflict," but
he envisions the "equally logical inevitability of more numerous intracircuit conflicts
among three judge-panels" and the accompanying need in such a regime to create a
mechanism to resolve such conflicts. Id.
234. The Commission also does not recommend the consolidation of the
intermediate appellate tier. "We have concluded.., that the system of geographical
circuits has not outlived its usefulness and that a decentralized administrative structure
for the federal judiciary continues to be an effective means of administering this vast
nationwide system of courts." REPORT, supra note 4, at 59. The report goes on to state
that the circuit boundaries are "firmly established in the American legal order, and
changing them would impose substantial disruptive costs." Id.
235. See Baker, supra note 215, at 34.
236. See id.
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would entail allowing the federal courts of appeals to select certain cases
for plenary review based on the briefs.n3 Under such a regime, "[m]ost
appeals would be 'affirmed' without opinion" and courts of appeals
would be transformed into "primarily law-declaring courts" and not
error-correcting courts.2"
Professor Baker would assign the error-correcting function to
appellate divisions in the district court*79 His proposed district court
appellate divisions would sit in three-judge panels and review district
court decisionsY.2 0 This would reduce the number of appeals and the
number of issues brought in the courts of appeals.24  The White
Commission also suggests the creation of district court appellate
divisions, or that Congress alternatively authorize federal appellate
courts to sit in two-judge panels. 2 According to the Commission, the
use of two-judge panels will save time and result in increased
productivity at the court of appeals level.243  The very notion of
discretionary appellate review and district court appellate panels "may
seem to upset the assumptions behind the present structure of the federal
intermediate courts." But Professor Baker thinks that such concerns
can be allayed.245
Regardless of how these reforms are to operate in practice, however,
discretionary appellate review represents an abandonment of the
traditional concept of one appeal as of right. Indeed, the "basic
argument" motivating discretionary appellate review "is to recognize
that the appeal-as-of-right is gone forever, the victim of procedural
shortcuts implemented over the years to cope with the deluge of
237. See id.
238. Id. at 35.
239. See id. at 34-35.
240. See id. at 35.
241. See id. Baker favors that these two proposals be implemented in tandem and
does not favor instituting discretionary review at the appellate level without the
corresponding district court appellate review. See id. at 34-35. The Commission
similarly recommends that "Congress authorize the courts to experiment with shifting a
portion of the reviewing task to the trial court level." REPORT, supra note 4, at 64.
242. See REPORT, supra note 4, at 62. The report anticipates that the two-judge
panels will decide those cases "in which the outcome is clearly controlled by well-settled
precedent." Id. at 63. But the report also recommends that the Federal Judicial Center
monitor the use of two-judge panels and the types of cases it reviews. See id.
243. See id. at 62.
244. Baker, supra note 215, at 35.
245. See id. (assigning the task of allaying such fears to a future law review article).
appeals." Indeed, Professor Baker recognizes that, under the regime
he favors, some cases will be summarily affirmed and not reviewed by
either the appellate court or a district court appellate panel. He thinks,
however, that because the notion of appeal as of right is defunct anyway,
we should simply recognize that reality.
Professor Baker's assumption in this regard is subject to serious
question. Under the present system, every appeal in the federal courts of
appeals gets some degree of attention from a three-judge panel. Some
appeals no doubt get less attention than others because of their less
complex nature; but litigants can rest assured that their appeal will at
least be considered by three judges. The preservation of the present
system is important because some "simple" appeals-those that
discretionary appellate review would no doubt consign to summary
affirmation-occasionally involve important issues which, under the
present system, are caught by reviewing judges. As such, rumors that
appeals as of right are already dead are highly exaggerated.
Professor Baker's system also presents an additional problem-
determining what is "error-correction" and therefore an appropriate
function for district court appellate review and what is "an issue of law"
to be reviewed by an appellate panel. The distinctions between the two
are less than perfectly straightforward. "Error-correction" cases often
involve issues of law and an appellate court's correction of an error can
result in an opinion that advances the law or creates new law. The
concepts are inherently interwoven and may be impossible, or at least
are not easy to separate in practice.
This discussion is not intended to demonstrate that the measures
Professor Baker and others suggest are wholly unreasonable or
unworkable. We do not suggest that these proposals should never be
considered at any time in the future. But each of the ideas comes with
either substantial cost or risk, or both. Given the degree of risk that they
pose, it would be wiser to first try less extreme alternatives.
C. The Modem Ninth Circuit: A Triumph of Innovative
Case Management
The Ninth Circuit has undertaken great efforts to deal with its
burgeoning docket. The court's innovations demonstrate that
administrative reform within a circuit is a more desirable alternative for
overcoming a caseload crisis than is the internal or outright division of a
circuit, the curtailing of the appellate courts' jurisdiction, or collapsing
the system of intermediate appellate courts.
246. Id. at 34.
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Over the years, the Ninth Circuit has surveyed its judges, the attorneys
of its bar, and bar organizations within the circuit to assess problems that
have arisen from the court's size and to deal with those problems in an
innovative fashion. To date, the Ninth Circuit has instituted a number of
programs intended to meet the concerns of the professional community
the court serves.247  The Ninth Circuit's implementation of new
administrative and technological methods has improved the court's
efficiency in managing its growing workload and has allowed the court
to be more responsive to the needs of its consumers-litigants and the
attorneys who represent them. As a result, the overwhelming majority
of federal judges, attorneys, and official bar organizations agree that the
Ninth Circuit should not be split.248
The Ninth Circuit's assimilation of technological advances in e-mail,
computerized case management, and additional innovations have made
its handling of cases more speedy and efficient.249 In addition to taking
advantage of technological advancements, the Ninth Circuit has created
the position of Appellate Commissioner, developed an alternative
dispute resolution system and a submission-without-oral argument track
for less complex appeals, adopted internal administrative units, and
created the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel.
The creation of the Appellate Commissioner position conserves
"judge time" in a number of ways. To begin with, the Commissioner
may rule on non-dispositive motions formerly presented to two judges. 20
In addition, the Commissioner also reviews all Criminal Justice Act
voucher requests, thereby relieving all but the administrative judges of
responsibility for voucher processing."" Finally, upon referral from
judges, the Commissioner will hold evidentiary hearings in attorney
disciplinary matters and in cases where a criminal defendant seeks leave
to proceed pro se on appeal and may issue attorney fee awards in civil
appeals.52
Additionally, in order to reduce the number of appeals disposed of by
written disposition, the Ninth Circuit has "[d]eveloped an alternative
247. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 36, at 240 (noting that the Ninth Circuit "has been
[the acknowledged] leader in developing and [applying] creative measures to treat the
[complications that many regional circuits do and will confront]").
248. See Hug, supra note 154, at 306.
249. See Baker, supra note 11, at 932.
250. See Ninth Circuit Long Range Plan, supra note 130.
251. See id.
252. See id.
dispute resolution proposal in which court mediators may invite parties
in civil appeals to stipulate to having their appeal referred for a binding
award by the appellate commissioner."
The court has also carried out a number of additional reforms aimed at
the more speedy resolution of appeals. A "submission-without-oral-
argument track" has been instituted for cases that are less complex or are
easily disposed of by established precedent. The court has begun to
funnel appropriate three-weight appeals into this program, where a three-
judge screening panel has been able to resolve 83% of such cases to
date.25 In addition, staff attorneys "now present[_ all pro se appeals to
screening panels regardless of weight," and "pro se appeals continue to
be routinely screened for inclusion in the court's pro bono counsel
program." 6
Two of the Ninth Circuit's more bold changes are the adoption of
administrative units within the court and the creation of the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel. In an effort to decentralize, the Ninth Circuit
established internal administrative units. In 1980, the circuit established
three geographic units based in San Francisco, Pasadena, 2 7 and Seattle.
While all major adjudicative' 3 functions of the court are still carried out
at the central clerk's office in San Francisco, many nonadjudicative
duties have been decentralized. For example, the "satellite" clerk's
office in Pasadena has assumed responsibilities of the space and storage
needs of the southern unit, and presently handles building maintenance
and the procurement of equipment and supplies. 9
In addition, the Ninth Circuit has established an administrative chief
judge for each of the three units. The importance and prominence of the
role of administrative chief judge may fluctuate depending on the judge
holding the office, but the position does come with substantive duties.'
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See Ninth Circuit Long Range Plan, supra note 130.
256. Id.
257. The Southern California base of operations was temporarily set up in Los
Angeles and Pasadena. It was moved entirely to Pasadena following the 1986
completion of the Richard H. Chambers Courthouse. See Thomas W. Church, Jr.,
Administration of an Appellate Leviathan: Court Management in the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, in RESTRUCTURiNG JUSTICE 226, 233 & n.15 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990).
258. The clerk's office's adjudicative roles include "accepting and keeping track of
the vast flow of case-related filings, monitoring presubmission progress of appeals,
assignment and scheduling of three-judge panels, and distribution of briefs and other
submissions to the judges prior to oral argument." Id. at 237.
259. See id. at 238. Church argues that "those aspects of an appellate court's
administrative structure which support its adjudicative functions are best organized to
encourage the maintenance of the unifying, centralizing function of the court," even in a
circuit as big as the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 240.
260. See id.
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The administrative chief judge of each unit within the Ninth Circuit is
charged with
overseeing the clerk's office in the unit and reviewing support services
(including space needs and improvement of facilities). Moreover, the
administrative chief judge serves as a liaison between the court of appeals and
the district courts and bar associations in the unit and 'maintain[s] cgtact with
Court of Appeals judges within the unit and report[s] on their needs.'
Other duties of the administrative chief judge include reviewing
"reports of cases under submission with the judges in the unit," serving
on the Ninth Circuit's executive Committee, and rotating through one
position on the circuit judicial council.262
Finally, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, or "BAP," offers a
specialized appellate panel specifically devoted to providing
intermediate appellate review of single-judge bankruptcy decisions. If
questions still remain, the BAP's decisions may then be appealed to the
Ninth Circuit. This system has been a success in the Ninth Circuite' and
has been implemented in several other circuits.
VII. CONCLUSION
The current structure of the Ninth Circuit presents no unique problems
that justify its internal division or other reorganization. Rather,
Congress should refocus the debate and consider implementing the
Ninth Circuit's case management program and other innovations in all
federal circuits which now face or which will in the near future face case
management crises.
The available evidence indicates that the Ninth Circuit's efforts to
manage its caseload have been successful. Intra-circuit conflicts are
under control. Case disposition time is improving and will continue to
improve with the confirmation of already appointed judges and the
future appointment of judges to vacant seats. Furthermore, lawyers and
judges within the Ninth Circuit seem reasonably happy with the court's
performance.
Based on all of the foregoing, it is unwise to resort to drastic measures
such as ridding ourselves of the entire federal appellate system as we
know it or splitting or internally dividing circuits to deal with exploding
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See REPORT, supra note 4, at 68.
dockets. That problem is common not only to all federal courts of
appeals, but to all courts in the nation. Moreover, it will not fade with
the disappearance of appellate circuits or their present structure.
Congress should resist the temptation to build the road to the future
hastily and without sufficiently understanding the exact problem it is
trying to solve.
